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REDEFINING THE LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
AFTER NEC v. INTEL
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act1 has been continually adapted to serve new
forms of creative expression. Whereas original copyright law pro-
tected only maps, charts, and books,2 it now encompasses sound re-
cordings, motion pictures, and photographs." In 1980, Congress took
a decisive step in amending the Copyright Act to bring computer
software programs within the ambit of the statute." Unlike tradi-
tional subject matter, computer software programs do not communi-
cate to human beings. Instead, these programs direct the computer to
proceed through predetermined functions.' Since Congress had, until
1980, limited the application of copyright protection to works that
were both expressive and non-utilitarian,' the recent extension of
copyright protection to computer technology has raised complicated
issues of policy. Chief among these issues is whether copyright pro-
tection is the correct mechanism by which to protect computer pro-
grams and whether such protection furthers the essential purpose of
copyright law: to encourage the free dissemination of scientific ideas
and information for the advancement of science and the arts. Courts,
however, have not adequately addressed these questions. They have
neglected substantive policy issues and have instead focused exclu-
sively on interpreting the literal words of the statute.
© 1988 by Rebecca A. Speer
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1476].
3. The subject matter of copyright includes literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic,
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and
sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
4. The law that extended copyright protection to machine-readable programs was § 10,
subd. (a), (b) of the Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)) [hereinafter Copyright Act]. The copyright amendments in-
volved the addition of computer program to § 101, the definitional section of the Copyright
Act, and the substitution of a new § 117 that gave owners of copyrighted programs a limited
right to modify and to make archival copies of the computer programs.
5. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text (explaining the nature and function of
computer programs).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at I (discussing the history of copyright law).
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Most recently, a federal district court in NEC Corp. and NEC
Electronics, Inc. v. Intel Corp.' brought microcode within the pro-
tection of the Copyright Act.8 In extending copyright protection to
microcode, the NEC court reasoned that microcode falls within the
definition of "computer program" provided by the 1980 amendment
to the Act: "a set of statements to be used directly or indirectly
within a computer to bring about a certain result."9 Although
microcode may be considered such a "set of statements," it also con-
trols the basic functions of the computer and is decidedly more func-
tional than the software programs contemplated by Congress in
1980. Thus, NEC v. Intel signified an abandonment of the tradi-
tional notions of nonutility and expressiveness used in applying
copyright law to particular types of subject matter-all in an effort
to protect a form of new technology.
This Comment explores whether microcode properly belongs
within the scope of the Copyright Act. Part II provides a background
of the traditional tenets of copyright law and traces the movement of
Congress and the courts away from expressiveness and nonutility in
copyright subject matter. The background examines Congress' deci-
sion to extend copyright protection to software and finds the decision
was largely influenced by the recommendation of the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), a commission that failed to adequately assess the utilita-
rian nature of computer programs. The Comment next discusses the
NEC v. Intel decision and the negative policy implications of ex-
tending copyright protection to utilitarian and unexpressive subject
matter.
The Comment concludes by proposing an alternative scheme of
legal protection for microcode. The proposed sui generis law pre-
serves the integrity of copyright law by explicitly removing
microcode from the scope of the Copyright Act. Further, it attempts
to strike a balance between serving the public and protecting the ef-
forts of the individual microcode author by requiring a greater de-
gree of disclosure from authors and by granting legal protection of a
shorter duration than that offered by the Copyright Act. In all, the
proposal aims to protect this unique technology while preserving the
7. 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
8. The case was originally heard by Judge Ingram, Northern District Court of Califor-
nia. Id. at 593. Judge Ingram subsequently resigned from the case due to a conflict of interest,
and all rulings were vacated. The case was then reassigned to Judge Gray, Central District of
California. Trial began in April 1988 but was continued until June 1988.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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traditional objectives of copyright law.
II. PRESENT LAW AND TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
The 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act was Congress' an-
swer to the call of a rapidly expanding computer industry for protec-
tion of its innovations and discoveries. Computer programs fit neatly
under neither patent nor copyright law. They lack the novelty de-
manded by the patent statute, and the courts have struggled to an-
swer whether the programs constitute the "works of authorship"
protected by the Copyright Act." In 1973, Congress appointed
CONTU to examine whether computer programs fell within the
scope of existing laws. The commission concluded that computer
programs belonged within the ambit of the Copyright Act and en-
dorsed an amendment explicitly listing the programs as copyright-
able subject matter." Some commentators, however, consider
CONTU's decision a "forcible wrenching" of computer technol-
ogy-subject matter patently unlike that traditionally covered by the
Copyright Act-into the words of the statute and a deviation from
traditional copyright notions of expressiveness and nonutility. 12
A. Traditional Principles
Copyright law has been compared to a simple bargain in which
the interest of the individual and that of the public coincide.' 3 The
individual derives an economic benefit from holding exclusive rights
over his or her expression, and the public benefits from its use of the
ideas and information the copyrighted expression conveys.' 4 Al-
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) reads, in pertinent part: "Copyright protection subsists, in accor-
dance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
11. 23 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978), reprinted in 3 COMP. L.J. 53 (1981) [hereinafter CONTU
Report].
12. See, e.g., Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection
For Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 [hereinafter Sam-
uelson, CONTU Revisited]; CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 93 (Commissioner Hersey's
Dissent).
13. See Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change Before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 60 (1983) ("Copyright is an amalgam of property law principles bent to the service of a
rather simple bargain. A limited term of protection against copyright is granted to an author's
original expression in exchange for the dedication of that expression to the domain at the end
of the term." Id.).
14. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 11-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
19881
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though one may argue the sole purpose of copyright law is to provide
incentive for authorship, Congress historically has granted exclusive
ownership rights, whether by patent or copyright, only when doing
so has conferred a benefit on the public as well as the individual.15
In fact, both legislative and judicial history clarify that the public is
to be considered the primary beneficiary of the social bargain. The
Joint Conference Committee of the House and Senate has stated
with respect to copyright protection: "Although a copyright belongs
to an author during its term, the ultimate purpose of this bargain is
not to protect the authors but rather to enrich the public domain."' 6
The United States Supreme Court similarly asserted in Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios:17 "The copyright law, like the patent stat-
ute, makes rewards to the owner a secondary consideration."'"
Both patent and copyright law requirements operate to preserve
this social bargain. Under patent law, an inventor must reveal the
process of making and using the invention as quid pro quo for exclu-
sive rights over the invention." This comprehensive disclosure, cou-
pled with a relatively short, 17-year, term of protection, 2 assures the
public its freedom to practice an art that has not become obsolete by
the end of the term.
Copyright law likewise demands a quid pro quo: namely, that
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5750, 5754 ("The public has two opportunities to benefit from the
social bargain: once, when the original expression is created, and then again when the expres-
sion is added to the public domain from which anyone may borrow freely." Id.) [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 781].
15. The Constitution states that the purpose of granting exclusive rights to authors and
inventors is "[tjo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
16. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5759. In fact, The United States Supreme
Court has consistently treated copyright law as a social policy tool rather than as a natural
right. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's opinion in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that "the immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the public good." Id. (emphasis added)); See also H.R. REP. No. 781,
supra note 14, at 5753 (the Joint Conference Committee of the House and Senate expressing a
similar view: "The monopoly privileges that Congress may confer are neither unlimited nor
are primarily designed to provide a private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved." (emphasis added)).
17. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
18. Id. at 429 (quoting Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1923)).
19. An inventor must submit a specification with the patent application. 35 U.S.C. §
111 (1982). The specification must contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which is most clearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention. Id. § 112.
20. d. § 154.
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the protected matter itself disclose ideas and information to the pub-
lic. This disclosure requirement is implied by section 102,1 which
requires that works of authorship be fixed in any tangible "medium
of expression" from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
"otherwise communicated." "Medium of expression" indicates any
literary, musical, graphic, or artistic form in which the author ex-
presses intellectual concepts." The form may be one not contem-
plated at the time the Copyright Act was enacted,"3 but at a mini-
mum, it must be tangible, thereby permitting the work of authorship
to be perceived.2' In other words, the Copyright Act confers copy-
right protection only to works that ultimately communicate ideas and
information to a human audience.
This dissemination of ideas and information is central to copy-
right law. As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Selden, "[tihe
very object of publishing a book. . . is to communicate to the world
the useful knowledge which it contains."' The Copyright Act, in
fact, does not demand novelty or ingenuity of expression; rather, its
aim is to draw into' the public domain an abundance of expressions,
targeting a wide variety of audiences with differing tastes.2 6 As the
Court concluded in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, the
copyright law "must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."27
In addition to disclosure, or "expressiveness," the Copyright Act
demands that the works of authorship be non-utilitarian:28 they must
21. "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression known or later developed, from which it can be perceived,-
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 5 ("[Copyright] pertains to the literary,
musical, graphic, or artistic form in which the author expressed intellectual concepts.").
23. The Copyright Act refers to tangible mediums of expression now "known or later
developed." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). In drafting the bill, Congress did not want to freeze the
scope of copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology. H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 3.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2 ("The work of authorship must be embodied in
a form sufficiently permanent or stable to permit the work to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
25. 101 U.S. (Otto 11) 99, 103 (1879).
26. Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PIrr. L. REv.
1119, 1123 (1986) ("Literature and the arts are centrifugal, aiming at a wide variety of audi-
ences with different tastes. . . . The aim of copyright is to direct investment toward abundant
. . . expression.").
27. 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5757 (referring to the prohibition against
copyright in useful articles as a "fundamental principle" of copyright law).
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not have an intrinsic function other than to depict the appearance of
the article or convey information."' Section 102 of the Copyright Act
expressly prescribes that although an expression may be protected,
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery described by the expression may not."0 This
prohibition against copyrights in utilitarian articles preserves the in-
tegrity of patent law by denying protection to useful articles that do
not meet the standards of inventiveness and novelty set by the patent
statute. Patent law protects only true inventions;"1 copyright law, on
the other hand, imposes no such requirement of novelty or ingenu-
ity."' Conferring copyright protection on utilitarian articles, then,
would allow wholesale circumvention of the more demanding re-
quirements of patent law.
Courts traditionally have respected both the expressiveness and
nonutility requirements set forth by the copyright statute. They have
emphasized disclosure and dissemination of an author's ideas as the
immediate aim of copyright law"' and have drawn careful distinc-
tions between the expressive and utilitarian features of works of au-
thorship presented for copyright protection. In Mazer v. Stein, 4 for
instance, the Supreme Court held that copyright protection extends
only to those features of a utilitarian object that can independently
exist as copyrightable works. In considering whether a sculpted lamp
base should receive copyright protection, the Court limited copyright
protection to the lamp's statuette (the only expressive feature) and
denied copyright protection to the wiring (the utilitarian feature).""
The extension of copyright protection to computer programs in
1980 disturbed these settled principles, as computer programs are
29. The Copyright Act defines a "useful article," to which it explicitly denies protection,
as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appear-
ance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). An expressive article,
then, does no more than portray its appearance or convey information.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) reads in full: "In no case does copyright protection for an origi-
nal work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work." Id. In contrast, the patent law protects any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
31. Again, only a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter" may be patented. Id. Moreover, subject matter offered for patent protection must be
non-obvious, or sufficiently different than prior art. Id. § 103.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 1 ("[The copyright] standard does not in-
clude requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit ... ").
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (Otto 11) 99, 103 (1879); Twentieth Century,
422 U.S. at 156.
34. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
35. Id. at 217-18.
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both utilitarian and unexpressive. The sections below describe how
legislative and judicial migration from traditional copyright princi-
ples was largely premised on an under-estimation both of the utilita-
rian nature of computer programs and of the consequences resulting
from their inclusion in the Copyright Act.
B. The Nature and Function of Computer Programs
The computer is predominantly a decision-making machine"'
that responds to changes in internal voltage levels3 7 in order to exe-
cute the series of steps necessary to solve predetermined problems.
The computer's decision-making process is surprisingly familiar.
Consider the decisions a taxpayer must make in computing taxable
income."3 Internal Revenue Form 1040 instructs the taxpayer to
compare an amount entered on line 67 of the form to the amount
entered on line 59. If the amount on line 67 is greater than the
amount on line 59, the taxpayer must enter the difference on line 68.
If instead the amount on line 67 is less than the amount on line 59,
the taxpayer must enter the difference on line 71. These decisions
are based on a computation (the addition of values entered on lines
59 and 67) and a simple condition (if line 67 is greater than line 59,
that amount must be entered on line 68; if line 67 is less than line
59, that amount must be entered on line 71).
A computer programmer can represent this same set of instruc-
tions as an algorithm, which in turn is either engrafted upon the
computer hardware or implemented as a software program." Using
a flow chart as a graphical blueprint for constructing the hardware
circuitry or software program,40 the programmer can instruct the
computer to perform the mathematical calculations required by
36. Patterson, Microprogramming, ScL. AM., Mar. 1983, at 50. A decision is a choice
from among two or more possible courses of action. Decision-making within a computer is the
operation of taking alternative courses of action in accordance with specified conditions. M.
WEIK, THE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 116
(1977) [hereinafter STANDARD DICTIONARY].
37. See Stern, The Case of the Purloined Object Code: Can It Be Solved? Part 1: The
Problems, BYTE, Sept. 1982, at 430 (explaining that computers do not understand electric
signals in the same sense that a person understands a book).
38. Patterson, supra note 36, at 50-51 (explaining how a computer can be programmed
to complete Internal Revenue Service Form 1040).
39. THE DICrIONARY OF NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 157 (2nd ed. 1986) (de-
fining an algorithm as "a procedure, or rule, for the solution of a problem in a finite number
of steps" Id.).
40. Before the programmer writes any code, he or she develops the program flow logic,
the logical sequence of steps the program will perform to accomplish its functions. See R.
BANKS & A. DOUPNIK, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE ch. 3 (1976).
1988]
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Form 1040 and store the results at specific addresses in the com-
puter's memory. 1 The programmer can then direct the computer to
compare the appropriate sums and, based on that comparison, either
execute the steps necessary to determine the amount of taxes over-
paid or underpaid.
As mentioned, the programmer can implement the algorithm in
either hardware or software. In fact, early computers were com-
prised entirely of hardware, and in order to alter the sequences of
high- and low-voltage impulses that direct the computer, program-
mers had to actually rewire it." Software introduced an alternative
to this cumbersome rewiring process by permitting programmers to
represent the desired electronic impulses symbolically. Thus, a
programmer may now alter the operations performed by the com-
puter either by restructuring the hardware circuitry or, more simply,
by changing the software instructions.
Initially, programmers could write programs only in binary
code, with ""s and "0"s representing high- and low-voltage im-
pulses, respectively. The advent of computer languages such as
FORTRAN, BASIC, and COBOL48 made programming easier by
substituting the strings of "I"s and "0"s with commands written in
the English language.' Most programmers write software in these
more accessible languages, or "source code,""' but computers can
only comprehend "object code," the series of electrical impulses exe-
cuted within the computer that direct the computer through the de-
sired decision-making process."" Physical compilers and translators
41. Patterson, supra note 36, at 50. The computer's memory is a device which retrieves
data, holds and, at a later time, returns data. Various phenomena, such as electrostatic, mag-
netic, electrical, and mechanical, are used to effect memory. STANDARD DICTIONARY, supra
note 36, at 328.
42. Rewiring the first general purpose electronic computer, pioneered in 1946, was done
by setting thousands of switches and plugging in hundreds of cables, hand by hand, one at a
time. Its pioneers called it a "one way ticket to a madhouse." S. AUGARTEN, BIT BY BIT: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF COMPUTERS 128 (1984).
43. See, e.g., R. CONWAY, D. GRIES, & D. WORTON, INTRODUCTION TO STRUC-
TURED PROGRAMMING (1977).
44.. An example of a BASIC instruction is "GOTO 150," which causes the computer to
carry out the instruction on line 150 of the program. Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protec-
tion of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for Object Code?, 3 COMP. L.J. 1, 2 n.5
(1981).
45. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 76 n.109 (1981) (referring to "source code" as a
computer program written in any of several programming languages employed by computer
programmers).
46. Every program is eventually reduced to object code, which is expressed in binary
(base 2) numbers, as a series of "0"s and "I"s that represent open and closed switches within
the computer's circuits. Object code, in either its binary form or in the silicon chip form, is not
[Vol. 28
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within the computer translate the source code into the object code.
C. CONTU's Recommendation to Congress
In considering whether the Copyright Act should be amended to
include computer programs, CONTU failed to appreciate that the
sole function of computer programs is to direct the physical workings
of the computer. This failure turned out to be a fatal error. In its
report to Congress, CONTU offered Congress several reasons for
bringing computer programs within the Copyright Act: (1) computer
programs are valued highly by society;' (2) programs are relatively
easy to copy;"8 and (3) trade secret and patent laws are unfeasible
forms of protection.' 9 CONTU premised its recommendation on a
belief that extending copyright protection to computer programs
would comport with both the spirit of the Constitution and the lan-
guage of the Copyright Act, reasoning that the Copyright Act has
been continually expanded to accommodate changes in communica-
tion technology, such as the advent of motion pictures, and conclud-
ing that its further adaptation to computer technology would comply
with constitutional mandate.50
Although CONTU's majority correctly stated that the Copy-
right Act has an expansive history, it failed to note that its scope
prior to 1980 was only broadened to include subject matter that com-
municates to human beings. Dissenting members of the committee
quickly pointed to this weakness in the majority report. Commis-
sioner Hershey wrote:
Copyright has always protected the means of expression of vari-
ous forms of "writing" which were perceived, in every case, by
the human sense for which they were intended: written words
by the human eye, music by the ear, paintings by the eye. Here,
for the first time, the protection of copyright would be offered to
a "communication" with a machine.51
Commissioner Hershey argued that, although programmers may
read each other's preparatory writings, the programs cease to be
''expressive" once software instructions are embodied in a silicon
designed to be read by humans. It is the machine's language. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
47. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 56.
48. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 58.
49. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 68-71.
50. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 67.
51. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 101.
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chip. He wrote: "If a skilled programmer can 'read' a program in its
mature, machine-readable form, it is only in the sense that a skilled
home-appliance technician can 'read' the equally mechanical printed
circuits of a television receiver.
' 52
Besides failing to note a difference between matter that com-
municates with human beings and that which communicates solely
with machines, CONTU also misread the Copyright Act as unam-
biguously applying to computer programs."' Again, the Copyright
Act, which Congress most recently amended in 1976, extends copy-
right protection only to "works of authorship fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression." CONTU argued copyright protection attaches
at the moment instructions written in program language (the work of
authorship)" become fixed onto a ROM chip (the tangible medium
of expression)." However, CONTU never considered whether
ROM chips, which Commissioner Hershey deemed to be as "reada-
ble" as printed circuits, are in fact a medium of expression. The
majority instead appeared satisfied that ROM's are a "tangible me-
dium of expression" merely because they are "tangible." It never
asked, however, whether ROM's are indeed "expressive" and ulti-
mately serve to disseminate the ideas and information embodied in
the program, the purported "work of authorship."
Commissioner Nimmer suggested in his concurrence that Con-
gress could fulfill the "expressiveness" requirement by limiting copy-
right protection to programs that produce independently copyright-
able works." Computer games, which produce a relatively static
video image that resembles a conventional photograph, are an exam-
ple of such a work.5" However, the majority dismissed this distinc-
tion between programs that do and those that do not produce expres-
sive output and recommended copyright protection for all computer
programs, including those programs that provide little or no overt
52. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 90.
53. The majority seemed confident that its conclusions were demanded by the words and
history of the 1976 Copyright Act. See CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 71-78. Commis-
sioner Hersey, however, believed that the 1976 Copyright Act could not be clear on the issue
of computer programs, if only because the conventional terms of the statute (e.g., "copy,"
"tangible means of expression") were inappropriate to the new technology. See CONTU Re-
port, supra note 11, at 93-97.
54. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 76.
55. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 57.
56. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 85 (stating that it may prove desirable to limit
copyright protection for software to those computer programs that produce works which them-
selves qualify for copyright protection).
57. Compare a computer game with, for example, a wordprocessing program, which
produces a video image that continually changes with the introduction of new data.
[Vol. 28
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communication to the computer user. It reasoned that the ultimate
use to which computer programs are put is irrelevant, contending
that computer programs satisfy the requirements of the Copyright
Act once software instructions become fixed onto ROM. The major-
ity also argued that copyrights traditionally have been extended to
works of authorship, regardless of their ultimate use.58
However, the majority rested its conclusion on the faulty as-
sumption discussed above: that ROM's are "mediums of expres-
sion." Moreover, the majority failed to recognize that, unlike tradi-
tional subject matter such as books, computer programs are not
expressive in their own right, but become so only upon producing
expressive output. Programs operating traffic signals, for instance,
can be viewed as utilitarian machine processes to which the Copy-
right Act expressly denies copyright protection. Contrary to the ma-
jority's assertions, then, the ultimate use to which a computer pro-
gram is put is indeed critical.
In addition to its failure to accurately assess whether computer
programs are expressive, the CONTU majority never determined
whether, notwithstanding any expressive output, they are too utilita-
rian under the proscriptions of the Copyright Act to be properly
brought within the statute. Commissioner Hershey argued: "the pro-
gram itself, in its mature and useable form, is a machine-control ele-
ment, a mechanical device, having no purpose beyond being engaged
in a computer to perform mechanical work." 9 The majority rebut-
ted the assertion that the program is utilitarian by stating that copy-
rights will not be denied simply because an object has some utilita-
rian aspect."' Although, as the majority correctly noted, courts
generally do not refuse copyright protection on grounds that an ob-
ject possesses some utilitarian features, courts do limit protection to
the expressive features alone, and only to the extent those features
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing inde-
58. The CONTU majority states:
This distinction between [those computer programs that do and do not lead to
copyrighted output] is not consistent with the design of the Act of 1976, which
was clearly to protect all works of authorship from the moment of their fixation
in any tangible means of expression. Further, it does not square with copyright
practice past and present, which recognizes copyright protection for a work of
authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be put.
CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 75-76.
59. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 87.
60. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 76 ("Nor has copyright been denied to works
simply because of their utilitarian aspects.").
1988]
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pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the object." The CONTU
majority failed to answer whether, or which, computer programs
have independent, expressive features.
In sum, the CONTU report reveals a lack of reverence for the
expressiveness and nonutility requirements of copyright law. This
disregard for traditional copyright tenets was perpetuated by Con-
gress in 1980 when it adopted CONTU's recommendation and
amended the Copyright Act to include computer programs. As dis-
cussed below, courts subsequently interpreting the 1980 Copyright
Act generally have not questioned the wisdom of Congress' decision
to amend the statute. Instead, they have focused almost exclusively
on construing the term "computer program" as defined by the Copy-
right Act and have neglected broader questions of policy. The court
in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer,6 for instance, ex-
tended copyright protection to a computer program written in object
code, which is unintelligible to human beings. Other courts have ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the computer program to the re-
sult the program was designed to achieve, or to the program's utilita-
rian function.68
D. The Courts and the 1980 Amendment
The 1980 amendment defines a computer program as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result." '64 Initially, courts con-
sidered this language as covering only those programs written in
source code, such as FORTRAN. The third circuit court in Apple
Computer, however, broadened the definition to include programs
expressed in object code, which is a machine-readable language
unintelligible to human beings."5
In conferring copyright protection to object code, the court re-
jected the lower court's argument that works must be intelligible to
human beings in order to be worthy of copyright protection. The
court seems to have concluded that the 1976 amendment to the
61. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
62. 714 F.2d 1240 (1983).
63. See infra notes 71-78.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
65. 714 F.2d at 1248. Programmers typically write software in source code, and as dis-
cussed, translators or compilers translate the source code into the machine-level language the
computer can execute. The result of the translation is an electromagnetic configuration that
can be symbolized in binary number form as a series of "0"s and "l"s. This manifestation of
the program is the object code. R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-13
(1985).
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Copyright Act, which extended copyrights to works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression from which they can be
perceived either directly or "with the aid of a machine or device,"
discarded the requirement that subject matter communicate to
human beings."0 The court also considered the inclusion of computer
programs in the Copyright Act as a clear indication that Congress
intended to confer copyright protection to all computer programs,
regardless of whether they are expressed in source code or machine
language.6
7
However, the 1976 amendment was merely intended to bring
records and audio tapes, which operate in "machines or devices,"
within the Copyright Act" and plainly emphasizing ultimate per-
ception of an author's work by a human audience. Moreover,
CONTU and, by extension, Congress did not unequivocally consider
object code a proper subject of copyright.69 CONTU, in its report to
Congress, mentioned object code only in one conclusory statement 7
and was clearly divided on whether copyright protection should ex-
tend to machine-level language. Commissioner Hershey in fact urged
that all computer programs be denied copyright protection and Com-
missioner Nimmer advocated copyright protection only for those pro-
grams that create copyrightable works. Both Commissioner Hershey
and Nimmer, then, argued the Copyright Act should not apply to
programs that do not produce communication to a human audience.
Based on its misapprehension of legislative intent, the Apple
Computer court limited its inquiry to the issue of whether object
code falls within the definition of "computer program," concluding
that, as "sets of statements" used "directly" in a computer in order
to bring about a certain result, it does. 7 ' By focusing exclusively on
semantics, however, the court failed to address whether protection of
machine-level language, undecipherable by human beings, promotes
the underlying objective of copyright law: to encourage the "free dis-
semination of ideas and information." In so doing, the court refuted
the traditional 'requirement that subject matter be expressive.
66. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1248. The court stated, "[tihe answer to defendant's
contention [that copyrightable works must be intelligible to human beings] is in the words of
the statute itself." Id.
67. Id.
68. See Commissioner Hersey's dissent to the CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 101.
69. The Apple Computer court stated: "[The CONTU majority] clearly took the posi-
tion that object codes are proper subjects of copyright." 714 F.2d at 1248.
70. CONTU Report, supra note 11, at 76 ("Flow charts, source codes, and object codes
are works of authorship in which copyrights subsist.
71. 714 F.2d at 1248.
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Other courts have also neglected the nonutility requirement. As
the following cases illustrate, it is often inherently difficult, if not
impossible, to extend copyright protection to computer programs
without also protecting an underlying idea, process, or procedure.
The Copyright Act protects only expressions. Thus, the scope of a
copyright depends on what a court deems as the computer program's
"expression." Courts can either limit the protected "expression" to
the precise line-by-line program code or, instead, extend the defini-
tion to include the logic, design, structure, performance, or output of
the computer program. Courts generally have leaned toward a broad
interpretation of "expression" that includes the actual processes im-
plemented by a program.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.," both the plaintiff and defendant developed a computer pro-
gram intended for use in dental laboratories. However, they wrote
their respective programs in different source codes: the plaintiff in
EDL and the defendant in BASIC. In developing a program that
accomplished the same task as the plaintiff's, the defendant did not
simply translate the plaintiffs program into one written in EDL.
Such a direct translation is virtually impossible."3 Instead, the de-
fendant studied the manner in which the computer employing the
plaintiff's program received, assembled, calculated, held, retrieved,
and communicated data. Once the defendant understood the process
underlying the program, he wrote his own computer program.
Although the defendant did not copy the plaintiff's program by
translation, the court nevertheless found him guilty of copyright in-
fringement. In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that the
copyrightable "expression" of software programs embodies the man-
ner in which the programs operate, control and regulate the com-
puter in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and
producing useful information."4 The Whelan court's broad interpre-
tation, however, would allow a court to extend copyright protection
to the logic underlying the computer program.
Similarly, the court in Williams v. Arndt" granted broad copy-
right protection, suggesting that infringement can occur simply
where programs achieve similar results, regardless of whether simi-
larity exists between program codes. In Williams, the defendant de-
72. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
73. Id. at 1320 ("The evidence establishes that it would be very difficult if not impossi-
ble to literally translate a program written in EDL to a program written in BASIC.").
74. Id.
75. 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985).
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veloped a computer program designed to perform commodities trad-
ing according to the step-by-step method explained by the plaintiff in
his book. In concluding that the defendant had impermissibly copied
the plaintiff's book, the court clearly used copyrights to protect a
method, as opposed to merely an "expression," or the plaintiff's par-
ticular explanation of the commodities trading method.
Finally, the court in SAS Institute v. S & H Computer Systems,
Inc., 6 stressed that a mere similarity in "overall structure" between
one computer program and another could constitute infringement.
There, the court found infringement, although only 44/186,000ths of
the code constituting the defendant's program resembled the code
comprising the plaintiff's program.
Under a traditional construction of the Copyright Act, none of
these rulings are permitted since section 102 unambiguously denies
copyright protection to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery underlying a copyright-
able expression."' This distinction between a copyrightable expres-
sion and an uncopyrightable idea, method, or process was articulated
by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden. 8 There, the Court denied
copyright protection to a set of forms supplied with a book describing
the plaintiff's bookkeeping method, because those very forms had to
be used in order to employ the bookkeeping method. In denying
copyright protection to the forms, the Court reasoned that protecting
the forms would effectively confer a monopoly over the bookkeeping
method itself. The Court wrote: "The description of the art in a
book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation
for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is expla-
nation; the object of the other is use. [Only] the former may be se-
cured by copyright." 7
However, this distinction between "the book, as such, and the
art it is intended to illustrate,"80 becomes impossible when the work
of authorship is a computer program. Unlike a recipe, or any work
that instructs people on how to accomplish a task, computer pro-
grams do the task. They embody both the expression and the art. In
many instances it is impossible to protect so little as the line-by-line
program without also protecting an underlying idea or process. If
copyright protection extends to a method of achieving a certain re-
76. 605 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
78. 101 U.S. (Otto 11) 99 (1879).
79. Id. at 105.
80. Id. at 104.
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suit, innovators are precluded from creating programs that differ in
detail, but which implement and perhaps improve on existing com-
puter programs.8" Thus, broad copyright protection ultimately frus-
trates, rather than promotes, the development of science and the arts.
In sum, courts interpreting the Copyright Act have dismissed
the expressiveness and nonutility requirements traditionally de-
manded by copyright law. Courts have not required meaningful
communication to human beings and have extended copyright pro-
tection to ideas, methods, and processes. NEC v. Intel threatens a
continued progression towards utility and lack of expressiveness in
copyright subject matter.
III. PRESENT LAW AND MICROCODE
The physical similarities between microcode and computer pro-
grams currently protected by the Copyright Act tempt an extension
of copyright by analogy. In fact, the court initially considering NEC
v. Intel"8 based its decision to grant copyright protection for
microcode largely on the physical similarities between
microprograms and software programs. However, by focusing on a
comparison of physical similarities, the court lost sight of copyright
policy and failed to examine the probable consequences of extending
copyright protection to microcode.
Copyright protection of some software has resulted in protection
of processes underlying the programs. Since microprograms consti-
tute an integral part of the microprocessor, copyright protection in
this instance would effectively confer exclusive rights over the ma-
chine itself. Before granting copyright protection to microprograms,
the courts should consider the substantive policy issues and redirect
the present course of copyright law.
A. NEC v. Intel: The First Round
In December 1984, NEC Corporation and its California sub-
sidiary brought an action against Intel Corporation seeking a decla-
ration that the microcode portion of the Intel 8086/8088
81. Id. at 103 ("The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But that object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.").
82. Again, the case was originally heard by Judge Ingram, Northern District Court of
California, who later disqualified himself on conflict of interest grounds.
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microprocessor is not subject to copyright protection. 8 The dispute
arose from a previously amicable relationship between the two com-
panies that began in 1976 when they entered into a patent licensing
agreement. In 1978, Intel introduced its 8086 microprocessor. NEC
became an alternate source for the 8086 upon the alleged encourage-
ment of Intel, who purportedly sought a second source for its prod-
uct in order to facilitate the 8086's acceptance into the market. NEC
engaged in a two-year reverse-engineering effort and in 1981 intro-
duced its counterpart to Intel's 8086, the NEC uPD8086
microprocessor.
Subsequently in 1984, NEC developed its own microprocessors,
the V-Series. NEC sought a declaratory judgment pronouncing In-
tel's 8086/8088 microprocessors uncopyrightable in response to In-
tel's contention that NEC had copied and derived the V-Series
microprograms from Intel's microprocessors. In its counterclaim, In-
tel sought an injunction prohibiting NEC from infringing Intel's al-
leged copyrights in the microprocessors.
In September 1986, after a three-month trial, the U.S. District
Court, Northern District of California, issued partial findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court held Intel's 8086/8088
microprograms copyrightable. 84 The court rested its conclusion ex-
clusively on a determination that the Intel microprograms resembled
software programs currently protected under the 1980 amendment,
noting that microprograms, just like software programs, are written
in source code and translated into object code and are often imbedded
in ROM chips. 8
However, microcode and software programs perform very dif-
ferent functions despite their superficial physical similarities.
Software programs prescribe the task a computer is to perform,
whereas microprograms determine how the computer will interpret
and execute the software instructions."6 The function of the
microprogram bears directly on the propriety of copyright protection,
83. Counsel for NEC and Intel present their respective renditions of the litigation and
arguments in Dunlap, NEC v. Intel: A Challenge to the Developing Law of Copyright in the
Protection of Computer Programs, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J. 3
(1987) and Hinckley, NEC v. Intel: Will Hardware Be Drawn into the Black Hole of Copy-
right?, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J. 23 (1987).
84. The court bifurcated the issues of copyrightability and infringement and did not
issue a judgment on the infringement issue.
85. NEC, 645 F. Supp. at 593.
86. In programming language, to "execute" is to interpret a computer instruction and
carry out the operations specified by the instruction. STANDARD DICTIONARY, supra note 36,
at 147.
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as it determines the ultimate scope of copyright protection.
B. Microcode: Nature and Function
Microcode is embodied in the computer's Central Processing
Unit (CPU), which contains the circuits controlling the interpreta-
tion and execution of software instructions."7 Each software instruc-
tion elicits a pattern of electronic signals that are sent to the CPU.
The CPU routes these signals among the computer's hardware com-
ponents. The CPU comprises two major parts: the arithmetic logic
unit (ALU) and the control unit.8 The ALU is the portion of the
computer containing circuits that perform arithmetic and logic oper-
ations.89 The control unit contains the circuits responsible for di-
recting the flow of electric signals within the computer."0
The control unit channels electric signals along control lines,
which may be compared to plumbing connecting the computer's
hardware devices.' The control unit directs the flow by sending
"on" and "off" control signals that respectively open or close valve-
like electronic devices called "gates."'" The ultimate function of the
control unit is to select and retrieve the software instructions, inter-
pret them, and transform them into control signals.
The control unit responds to different software instructions by
generating different sequences of control signals.'" The control unit's
response to any one particular software instruction can be altered in
two ways. Where the control unit is completely "hardwired," or per-
manently laid down in the CPU's electronic circuitry, the circuits
can be configured to generate the desired control signals. However,
this alteration is cumbersome, as modification of the control unit re-
quires a complete "rewiring."
Microprogramming' 4 offers an alternative. The sequence of
87. The CPU contains the circuits that control the interpretation and execution of the
software instructions. STANDARD DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 369.
88. Patterson, supra note 36, at 53.
89. Patterson, supra note 36, at 53.
90. Patterson, supra note 36, at 53.
91. A control line is a transmission line along which electronic signals are sent. STAN-
DARD DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 206.
92. These "gates" must be opened and closed at the right moment to get information
(the electrical signals) to the right place. The control signals must be precisely timed and the
rhythm of the entire processor is therefore synchronized to an internal clock. Put simply, the
function of the control system is to supply the control signals during the right clock cycles.
Patterson, supra note 36, at 52.
93. Patterson, supra note 36, at 52.
94. Microprograms are often called firmware, indicating their intermediate status be-
tween hardware and software.
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paths the engineer wishes the electric signals to follow may be em-
bodied in a software program stored in a separate memory unit in-
corporated into the CPU. This set of control instructions is the
microprogram, 5 which is written in microcode. The result is flexi-
bility: just as software allows programmers to change the task per-
formed by the computer, microprograms allow programmers to alter
the CPU-and thus the computer's interpretation and execution of
software-without rewiring the computer.
The similarity between microprograms and software lies in
their programmability."' Both contain a series of instructions stored
in a memory, to be carried out by the computer. Microprograms,
however, more closely resemble hardware because they become phys-
ically fixed in the computer and are usually unalterable in the nor-
mal course of operations. Like hardware, microprograms are invisi-
ble to the user.9 But perhaps most importantly, microprograms
resemble hardware in their functional aspects: they control the basic
functions essential to the execution of the software instructions" and
thereby determine the nature of the computer itself. Microprogram-
ming thus represents manipulation at the most elementary level of
the computer.
Two aspects of microcode have direct implications on copyright
law. Microprograms are decidedly functional: they become insepara-
ble from the computer's control unit and from the computer itself.
They therefore may be properly considered utilitarian articles, which
are explicitly denied protection under the Copyright Act. Further-
more, microprograms operate at the most elementary level of the
computer and are unintelligible to most users. In fact, computer
users are normally unaware of what, if any, microprograms are be-
95. Patterson, supra note 36, at 54-55. Some examples of microprograms include: (1)
Read Only Memory (ROM): a chip in which a permanent, unalterable microcode has been
embedded. A ROM is programmed by the manufacturer; (2) Programmable ROM (PROM):
a ROM that can be programmed once by the user; (3) Erasable PROM (EPROM): a ROM
that may be erased and reprogrammed by the user. To be erased, the EPROM must be re-
moved from the computer and exposed to ultraviolet light. See Ross, The Patentability of Com-
puter "Firmware," 59 J. PATENT OFF. Soc'y 731, 759-62 (1977).
96. Programming is the science of planning the solution of problems by reducing the
plan to a set of instructions that can direct the actions of a computer. STANDARD DICTIONARY,
supra note 36, at 275.
97. Most computer users are probably unaware of what, if any, microprograms are
being employed in their particular computers. Ross, supra note 94, at 756.
98. Microprograms are ordinarily used to control the execution of software instructions.
Less frequently, they are used to perform mathematical operations. Ross, supra note 95, at
757.
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ing employed in their particular computers."" This raises the issue of
whether microprograms are expressive in the copyright sense.
C. Probable Consequences
The utilitarian nature of some software renders it an uneasy
subject of copyright protection. Problems associated with copyright
protection of computer technology become even more pronounced
with respect to microprograms due to their more fundamental role
within the computer's operation. Microprograms constitute an inte-
gral part of the CPU. Whereas software dictates a task to the com-
puter, microprograms determine how the computer's control system
will interpret and execute those software instructions. This differ-
ence in function has serious ramifications for copyright law, as pro-
tecting microprograms would threaten to confer exclusive rights over
the machine and its most primitive functions.
Computer designers often use microcode to create software-com-
patible computers: where the hardware of computers A and B differ,
computer designers implement different microprograms into the
computers in order to enable them to run identical software.100
Problems arise, though, in instances where computers have similar
hardware. There, the computers need similar microprograms in or-
der to run similar software.
Consider the following example: Company A microprograms its
microprocessor to run software Z. Company B's hardware, which
was designed through legitimate reverse engineering technique, re-
sembles that of Company A. Given this similarity between hard-
ware, Company B needs a microprogram nearly identical to that im-
plemented by Company A in order to run software Z in its
computers. Should Company A hold copyrights in the
microprogram, Company B would be precluded from implementing
a similar microprogram into its microprocessor and designing a ma-
chine that functions similarly to that of Company A.
As this example illustrates, copyrights would preclude computer
companies from adapting their machines to the wide range of
software programs available on the market. Thus, a competitor
wishing to offer a functionally compatible microprocessor, which
does not infringe any patents given to the original microprocessor,
would be charged with copyright infringement solely on the basis of
99. Ross, supra note 95, at 756.
100. See Patterson, supra note 36, at 56.
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similarity in function. NEC has, in fact, advanced this argument.101
NEC has also argued that copyright protection of microcode
may defeat legitimate competition by precluding computer designers
from studying another's product, learning how it works, and then
using that knowledge to design a similar but improved product.1"2
NEC's fears appear legitimate in light of Whelan Associates. There,
the court found the defendant guilty of infringement even though he
had not directly copied the plaintiff's program. Instead, he had writ-
ten his own program based on an understanding of the way in which
the plaintiff's program functioned."0
The series of software cases cited above have demonstrated that
copyright law cannot successfully be applied to utilitarian articles.
With, respect to software, exclusive rights in the expression, or the
source and object codes, sometimes confers rights over the underlying
process, or the task the computer performs. The extension of copy-
right protection to microcode threatens to perpetuate a distortion of
copyright law by surreptitiously conferring exclusive rights over the
microprocessor itself.
D. A Possible Alternative
During its debate over extending legal protection to another ele-
ment of computer technology-the semiconductor chip-Congress
expressed substantial concern about the distortion of copyright doc-
trine. 4 The semiconductor chip is an element into which electronic
circuits are embedded, and it performs electronic circuitry func-
tions.1 05 Troubled by its utilitarian nature, Congress in 1984 opted
for a sui generis"' scheme of legal protection rather than granting
101. Hinckley, supra note 83, at 34-38. Counsel for NEC stated: "Any competitor
wishing to offer a functionally compatible computer or microprocessor could easily be charged
with copyright infringement by the original developer solely on the basis of similarity in func-
tion." Hinckley, supra note 83, at 38.
102. Hinkley, supra note 83, at 37 ("The cost to society of a copyright monopoly for
industrial products may be high. In some circumstances copyright may well discourage the
creation of new and better products. In many industries companies study competitors' prod-
ucts, learn from them, and use that knowledge to develop better products.").
103. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
104. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5754. "Where technological changes have
occurred, and those changes have had an impact on the lives of millions of people (as is the
case for semiconductor chips), Congress must be extremely careful that its approach be reason-
able and workable." Id.
105. STANDARD DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 70. Note also that a microprocessor is
a particular kind of semiconductor chip.
106. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98
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the semiconductor chip protection under the Copyright Act.107 Some
commentators were puzzled by this decision, as it appeared directly
inconsistent with Congress' seeming lack of concern for the utilita-
rian nature of the computer programs it had just recently brought
within the scope of the Copyright Act.' 08 One commentator contends
that Congress' decision to deny copyrights in semiconductor chips
due to their utilitarian nature indicates that Congress misunderstood
the utilitarian nature of computer programs at the time it enacted
the 1980 amendment.1 09 Congress' repeated references to the chips'
utilitarian nature when discussing the infeasibility of copyright pro-
tection lends support to this argument.
However, whether or not the Semiconductor Chip Act signals
an attempt by Congress to rectify a prior error in misapprehending
the utilitarian aspect of computer programs, it clearly indicates Con-
gress' present unwillingness to extend the Copyright Act to cover
additional utilitarian elements of computer technology. It also shows
a decided preference for a sui generis scheme of legal protection for
computer technology that escapes the proper boundaries of copyright
law. As Congress stated during the semiconductor chip debates, a sui
generis approach avoids doctrinal distortion and frees the Legislature
from the copyright framework, enabling it to devise a law better-
suited to the particular computer technology at hand." 0
Microcode presents the same problems posed by semiconductor
chips as it too falls in the gap that exists between the patent and
copyright laws. The creativity involved in developing microcode does
not meet the level of inventiveness required by the patent law. More-
over, microcode can be considered an algorithm, to which the patent
law explicitly denies protection."' Finally, patents, even if possible,
would neverless be impractical given the long delays inherent in the
patenting process and the rapid rate at which computer technology
develops." 2 With respect to copyright law, microcode is unexpressive
and utilitarian. As discussed above, it does not communicate with
human beings and routes electric signals within the machine. These
functional parallels between microcode and semiconductor chips and
Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. 11 1984)).
107. See generally H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14 (discussing Congress' decision to
adopt a Semiconductor Chip Act).
108. See Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Les-
sons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 476 (1985).
109. Id.
110. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5755.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
112. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5753.
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the common problems they present with respect to existing patent
and copyright laws, then, suggest Congress would be amenable to a
sui generis scheme of legal protection.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A Sui GENERIS LAW
The aim of a sui generis law should be two-fold: (1) to secure
the social bargain; and (2) to provide a law better suited to the un-
usual nature of microcode. Although a sui generis law would stand
apart.from the copyright and patent laws, it should be supported by
the same policy objective that dictates that exclusive proprietary
rights should be granted only insofar as they advance the public wel-
fare. The law would recognize the decidedly utilitarian nature of
microcode, realize the shortcomings of patent and copyright protec-
tion, and offer a feasible alternative.
A. Disclosure and Learning
Both copyright and patent laws require meaningful public dis-
closure of the matter protected as a quid pro quo for exclusive rights.
Under patent law, the patent holder must file with the patent office a
specification, including drawings and explanations of the inven-
tion."1 Under copyright law, traditional expressive subject matter,
such as books, inherently discloses to the public the ideas and infor-
mation it contains.
Computer programs, as microprograms prospectively would,
create a unique concern in this respect since, however, their expres-
sion is not disclosed when they are published. 4 The program does
not communicate to human beings, and although the Copyright Of-
fice requires those who wish to register their computer programs to
deposit with the Office the first and last twenty-five pages of the
source code of the program, this does not result in meaningful public
disclosure. As one author writes:
It is very easy for someone who wishes to disclose nothing about
his source code to the Copyright Office to do just that. All that
person must do is write fifty pages of "comments" [which are
not part of the program instructions], twenty-five of which will
be tacked on to the front and twenty-five to the end of the
source code. . . . [And], even if there is no intentional evasion,
the creative portions of a program are unlikely to be disclosed in
113. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
114. For a discussion of the disclosure issues surrounding computer programs, see Sam-
uelson, supra note 12.
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the first twenty-five or last twenty-five pages of the source
code. " '
In this way, a computer program discloses almost nothing in return
for the protection of the law. " 6
The sui generis law should recognize the importance of disclo-
sure to the "social bargain." The sui generis law would require the
proprietor of the program to submit a complete description of the
program in order to obtain protection. The description would re-
quire a conceptual description of the program, detailed enough so
that a skilled programmer could take the descriptive material and
write a program utilizing the concepts described to perform substan-
tially the same task as is performed by the registered program.
1 1 7
The registrar would make public the description, together with a
copy of the program in source or object code, from the beginning of
the term of the protection.
B. Reverse Engineering as an Alternative to Complete Disclosure
The public can also learn from a computer program by copying
it from its storage medium (such as the ROM) and analyzing its
logic flow and organization. Unlike copyright law, which prohibits
this direct copying, the sui generis law would allow reverse engineer-
ing as a form of "fair use."11 8 In this way, the law would permit
knowledge and techniques to be communicated to programmers
while prohibiting wholesale appropriation of another's work. This
arrangement would satisfy the full disclosure traditionally demanded
by both copyright and patent laws.
C. Term of Protection
It has been stated that the public benefits twice from the social
115. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 715-16.
116. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 710.
117. This is similar to the disclosure required by patent law. See supra note 111; see
also Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 280, 284 (1970) (summarizing the proposal submitted to the Patent Office
by I.B.M in 1968).
118. The "fair use" doctrine prescribes that a copyrighted work may be copied in lim-
ited circumstances without fear of infringement. Section 117 of the Copyright Act reads:
[It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make ...a copy or adaptation of that computer program provided ...that
such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no
other manner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980).
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bargain: once when the original expression is first created, and again
when the expression is added to the public domain from which any-
one may borrow freely to fashion new works. Under patent law, for
instance, the public benefits first from the original patented item and
again at the end of the term of seventeen years, when it is free to
create works that improve on the original. Unlike many other indus-
tries, the computer industry develops products and discovers technol-
ogies at a tremendous pace. The term of protection should be calcu-
lated accordingly. The public can benefit after legal protection ceases
only if the protected art has not become obsolete during the term of
protection. A term of ten or fewer years would most likely achieve
this purpose while providing substantial protection to the proprietor
of the program.119
D. International Protection
During congressional debates on the Semiconductor Chip Act,
some legislators preferred Copyright protection over a sui generis
law, reasoning that the Copyright Act might allow international pro-
tection under the existing copyright conventions. They also argued
that 200 years of legal precedents under the copyright law might
provide certainty regarding the scope of semiconductor chip
protection. 120
However, Congress rebutted the arguments posed by the propo-
nents of the copyright approach. With respect to international con-
siderations, Congress reasoned that any protection of the semicon-
ductor chips under the Uniform Copyright Convention (UCC)
would be speculative due to the technical problems inherent in fitting
chips under the UCC. Specifically, Congress was uncertain as to
whether a chip would constitute a "copy" according to UCC termi-
nology and whether it would be treated as a work of applied art so
as to justify its ten-year term of protection."" Moreover, since other
countries did not protect semiconductor chips, Congress could not be
assured they would agree to protect the functional features of a semi-
conductor chip under their copyright laws. If the United States en-
acted legislation to protect the works, it would be required to offer
protection to all foreign nationals without being certain that it would
119. Ten years is also the term of protection under the Semiconductor Chip Act. See
supra note 106.
120. See H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5756.
121. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5756.
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receive reciprocal protection in foreign courts.122 Congress concluded,
however, that it would instead seek international protection via bilat-
eral or multilateral agreements consistent with the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 23
V. CONCLUSION
A sui generis approach offers a definitive advantage of allowing
the Legislature to fashion a law matching the sophistication of
microcode technology. The law would use precise terms of art and
thereby avoid the conceptual confusion inherent in any attempt to
force microcode into the copyright statute. A sui generis scheme
would thus render the law not only more exact, but more certain of
compliance.
Rebecca A. Speer
122. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 5757. This principle is referred to as "na-
tional treatment" and is fundamental to the UCC.
123. Id.
[Vol. 28
